Chris (unnamed525) wrote in moraltheory,

Bring It

What possible coherent arguments could you have against the following principle offered as the fundamental principle of a mixed consequentialist-deontology? I will admit that the axiology underlying it is that freedom is inherently valuable, but I highly doubt that anybody who desires to unjustly restrict the freedom of any other person wishes their own freedom to be similarly restricted.
All moral agents have the right to do whatever they want as long as doing so does not create an unreasonable risk of infringement upon any right of any other moral agent.

Addendum: It being provable that a particular type of action has a 50% or greater probability of infringing upon any right of any person would qualify it as "unreasonable risk" and warrant its being stopped before it happens (like with drunk driving). Or, if an otherwise reasonable act actually does infringe upon a right, but it still wouldn't be warranted to stop it, since we don't know it's going to do that, but, I think we would be warranted in imposing compesantive (not punitative) punishment.
  • Post a new comment


    default userpic